Political Analyst, General Secretary of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) for Indramayu Regency.
The Constitutional Court (MK) ruling, numbered 374/PPU-XXIV/2026 and delivered on Thursday (October 29, 2026), has “rejected” a proposal to extend the term of office for members of the Regional Legislative Council (DPRD) until 2031. The proposal was submitted by three petitioners—all master’s students in law at Gadjah Mada University (UGM): Muhamad Zulfan, Jaif Saputera, and M. Khairul Mamnun.
This article does not aim to examine the Constitutional Court’s specific reasoning for the rejection—namely, that the petitioners lacked “legal standing”—but rather focuses on the fundamental provisions established within the 1945 Constitution (UUD), the nation’s supreme law.
The Constitution explicitly states:
Article 18, Paragraph (3):
“Regional governments shall have a regional legislative council (DPRD), the members of which are elected through a general election.”
Furthermore, Article 22E stipulates:
Paragraph 1: “General elections shall be held every five years.”
Paragraph 2: “General elections shall be conducted to elect the President/Vice President, members of the House of Representatives (DPR RI), members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD RI), and members of the Regional Legislative Council (DPRD).”
These are the provisions of the Constitution—the supreme law of the land (distinct from ordinary legislation)—which mandate that general elections must be held every five years to elect the President/Vice President, as well as members of the DPR RI, DPD RI, and the DPRD. In other words, under the provisions of the Constitution, there is no legal basis for extending the terms of office—for the President/Vice President, members of the House of Representatives (DPR RI), the Regional Representative Council (DPD RI), or regional legislative councils (DPRD)—beyond five years, nor for the appointment of individuals to these positions; rather, these offices must be filled entirely through the results of five-yearly elections.
The lawsuit filed by the three students is, in a sense, understandable, as it seeks a definitive constitutional interpretation following a previous Constitutional Court ruling (No. 135/PUU-2024), which mandated the separation of national and regional elections, with distinct schedules for each.
According to Constitutional Court ruling No. 135, the national election—covering the presidential/vice-presidential ticket, the DPR RI, and the DPD RI—is to be held in 2029. This would be followed, no later than two and a half years thereafter, by regional elections, encompassing the election of regional heads (Governors, Regents, and Mayors) held concurrently with the elections for regional legislative councils (DPRD) at the provincial, regency, and municipal levels.
The issue with their lawsuit lies in the proposed solution: a request to extend the terms of DPRD members beyond the five-year limit. This clearly contravenes constitutional provisions, specifically the articles mentioned above.
A constitutional solution to the complexities surrounding the implementation of the aforementioned Constitutional Court ruling would be as follows:
First, an amendment to the Constitution would be required regarding the relevant articles to allow for the possibility of extending DPRD terms beyond the five-year limit. This is because the Constitution explicitly sets the term for DPRD members at five years—the same duration as that of the President/Vice President, the DPR RI, and the DPD RI.
Constitutional amendments cannot be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, nor can they be altered by the legislative authorities (the Government and the DPR RI); they can only be enacted by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR RI). To date, the Constitution has remained untouched—even when an attempt was made to amend the provision limiting the presidency to two terms (in order to potentially allow for a third term for President Jokowi), the effort failed. Second, the option to separate national and regional elections could be implemented by 2031 without requiring an amendment to the Constitution. This scenario assumes that the 2029 legislative elections for regional representative councils (DPRD) would not span a full five-year term, serving instead as a transitional period—much like the transitional terms for the House of Representatives (DPR RI) and regional councils (DPRD) during the shift from the New Order to the Reform era, which also lasted less than five years.
In this framework, regional elections—comprising both the election of regional heads (pilkada) and the election of DPRD members—could be structured in line with the aforementioned Constitutional Court ruling. Adjusting the regional head elections is relatively straightforward, as “acting” officials (pelaksana tugas) could be appointed to ensure terms do not exceed five years. However, this option carries the potential for significant political “turbulence,” as it would result in DPRD terms shorter than the standard five years—even if such a duration remains within the tolerances permitted by the Constitution.
Third, this is the most viable option with the lowest political risk; it can be executed without amending the relevant articles of the Constitution. It involves maintaining the standard five-year election cycle while separating the presidential election from the legislative elections—a format previously used in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections.
This approach would alleviate the burden on voters and election officials, ensure that legislative election issues are not overshadowed by the presidential race, and allow the results of the legislative elections to serve as an updated reference for the nomination thresholds required for presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the elections that follow a few months later.
Given these three scenarios, we shall observe how the situation unfolds over the coming months as the discourse surrounding the package of election-related bills intensifies—including potential adjustments to the parliamentary threshold, the method for seat allocation, and changes to electoral districts.
It should be noted that these three frameworks serve to underscore that the primary function of the Constitutional Court is not to alter the Constitution itself, but rather to review the constitutionality of laws against the provisions of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court does not create new, substantive regulations; that is the prerogative of the lawmakers (the House of Representatives and the Government), provided that their actions do not conflict with the provisions established by the Constitution (UUD).
The state possesses an foundational ideology—Pancasila—and a constitutional basis—the 1945 Constitution (along with its four subsequent amendments). Should the Constitution ever be altered for the sake of tactical interests, the very foundation of our state would become fragile; this must never be allowed to happen.
Indramayu, November 1, 2026
Best regards,
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