By:
*Masduki Duryat*
_(Rector of the Al-Amin Islamic Studies Institute, Indramayu, and Lecturer at UIN Siber Syekh Nurjati Cirebon)_
The publication of the book *Islam ala Prabowo: Cara Prabowo Subianto Mengamalkan Ajaran Islam* (Islam à la Prabowo: How Prabowo Subianto Practices Islamic Teachings)—authored by Abdur Rahim Hasan, Rikal Dikri, and Mush’ab Muqoddas—has attracted attention not merely for its content, but primarily for the political context in which it appeared. The book features a prologue by H. Ahmad Muzani, an epilogue by Prof. Dr. KH. Asep Saifudin Chalim, MA., and contributions from various figures such as Prof. Dr. Abdul Mu’ti, M.Ed., Prof. Dr. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, M.Sc., and others. Its publication is not simply a political biography; rather, it represents an attempt to interpret Prabowo’s leadership through the lens of Islamic values. (Gramedia)
The authors clarify that the book does not aim to establish a “Prabowo school of thought” or a new form of Islam—an intention that certainly deserves respect. However, in the realm of politics, an author’s intent is not the sole determinant of a text’s meaning. The title, the timing, the speakers, the figures cited, and the public construction of a leader’s image all constitute part of the political message.
Thus, the more compelling question is not “Is this book a campaign tool?” but rather: why is there a need to systematically narrate Prabowo’s Islamic identity precisely as electoral anxieties begin to surface?
*From Personal Faith to Political Legitimacy*
This is the point that warrants a more critical reading of the book. When a political leader is viewed through the lens of Islam, what is being generated is not merely knowledge regarding the leader’s religious observance, but also a form of moral legitimacy.
Islam holds a powerful position in the Indonesian political imagination. Consequently, symbols, close ties with *ulama* (religious scholars), *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), and Islamic organizations—as well as the articulation of piety—carry significant political weight.
In recent years, Prabowo himself has increasingly engaged with circles associated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). During the 102nd anniversary of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in February 2025, he spoke of feeling a “soothing aura” emanating from the *Nahdliyin* (NU community). In 2026, he reaffirmed his emotional bond with NU, noting that he always felt at ease among its members. (President of the Republic of Indonesia)
All of this is insufficient to conclude the existence of a deliberate electoral strategy. Yet, from the perspective of political communication, this sequence of events clearly achieved something: an identity repositioning.
*When Numbers Begin to Disturb the Comfort of Power*
The context becomes more intriguing when survey figures are factored in. A Tempo Data Science survey conducted between July 31 and August 11, 2026, placed Dedi Mulyadi’s electability at 41 percent, compared to Prabowo’s 15 percent. In that same survey, Dedi garnered a positive impression rating of around 90 percent. The drop was particularly stark when compared to December 2025, when Prabowo stood at 48 percent. (IDN Times)
Of course, surveys are not the gospel of politics. Electability figures fluctuate, methodologies vary, and the 2029 election remains a long way off. Nevertheless, the shifting trajectory of public perception is worth interpreting as a signal.
This is where the term “electoral anxiety” becomes relevant. It does not imply that Prabowo is panicking or certain to lose his chances. Rather, electoral anxiety is best understood as an elite realization that past victories do not automatically translate into future success.
*The Faithful Are More Than Just an Electoral Market*
Thus, as religion begins to play a larger role in shaping a leader’s image, the public is entitled to ask: is Islam serving as an ethical framework for power, or is it being positioned merely as an electoral market?
This question is not born of cynicism toward Islam; quite the opposite—it stems from a deep respect for the faith. For if Islam is used merely as a political identity, the Muslim community risks being reduced to an “electoral market.” *Kiai* (Islamic scholars) become mere endorsers, *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) turn into bases for mobilization, and religious symbols are transformed into tools for political branding.
Yet, Islam possesses a robust tradition of challenging power. The Qur’an establishes justice as a fundamental principle (Surah Al-Ma’idah: 8), while trustworthiness and justice serve as the foundations of governance (Surah An-Nisa’: 58).
Therefore, a leader’s commitment to Islam should be judged by the consequences of their exercise of power, rather than merely by their proximity to religious symbols.
*From Money Politics to Technopopulism*
This is where a new political phenomenon becomes significant. Today’s voters cannot always be explained through the lens of “money politics.” They are increasingly influenced by a combination of populist sentiment, government performance, digital technology, the personalization of leadership, and perceptions regarding problem-solving capabilities.
Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti term this development “technopopulism”: a logic of electoral competition that fuses claims of closeness to “the people” with claims of technocratic competence (Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2021). (OUP Academic)
In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon explains why a candidate can garner attention not solely because of their political party, money, or political machinery, but rather because of his ability to cultivate the perception that he is active, present, speaks like the common people, and understands their daily struggles.
Politics has shifted: what is being marketed is no longer just ideology, but experience.
*From the “Indonesian Paradox” to the Prabowo Paradox*
Interestingly, Prabowo himself authored *Paradoks Indonesia dan Solusinya* (The Indonesian Paradox and Its Solutions, 2022). The book highlights the paradox of Indonesia as a resource-rich nation that nonetheless grapples with poverty and underdevelopment, while proposing economic sovereignty and people-centered democracy as part of the solution (Subianto, 2022). (Library Kiosk)
Now, a new and far more personal paradox has emerged: the very Prabowo who once discussed the Indonesian paradox is now confronting a political paradox of his own making.
He holds power, yet his electability is called into question. He commands a massive coalition, yet alternative figures manage to strike a stronger chord with the public. He champions a narrative of standing with the people, yet the public increasingly tests that narrative against the concrete realities of their daily lives.
And this is where the question regarding Islam resurfaces.
It is not a question of whether Prabowo is “Islamic,” but whether the exercise of power itself is Islamic. The book *Islam ala Prabowo* (Islam à la Prabowo) should not stop at asking whether Prabowo is a devout Muslim. A far more critical question is: does Prabowo’s exercise of power yield policies that reflect Islamic values?
Is poverty declining? Is inequality narrowing? Is corruption being combated? Are ordinary people finding justice? Are education, healthcare, employment, and food becoming more accessible? Is the exercise of power becoming more trustworthy and accountable?
For Islam does not require *branding* by those in power; rather, it is power that requires moral correction from Islam.
*Electoral Anxiety Must Not Become the Anxiety of the *Ummah**
Therefore, this book should be read with a dual perspective: one academic and one political.
Through an academic lens, we appreciate the effort to examine Prabowo’s spiritual and moral dimensions. Yet, viewed through a political lens, we must ask whether this construct is intertwined with the need to rebuild legitimacy amidst shifting voter preferences.
We must ensure that the electoral anxieties of the elite do not devolve into the exploitation of the public’s anxieties.
For the Muslim community is not merely a statistic in a survey. NU is not simply a vote-gathering machine. *Pesantren* are not just campaign networks. And religion is not merely a prop for the election season.
Ultimately, the people might be swayed by books, billboards, algorithms, religious figures, and narratives of piety. Yet, they possess a far simpler and more honest yardstick: their own lived experiences.
The title *Islam ala Prabowo* may well be open to debate. However, a far more critical question must be directed at those in power: If Islam is truly a core value for Prabowo, when will the people begin to experience those Islamic values in their own lives?
That is where the book ends, but the true test for Prabowo is only just beginning.**
Indramayu, September 7, 2026
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