By: Adlan Daie
Political Analyst; General Secretary of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Indramayu Regency.
Indramayu, August 21, 2026
In the tradition of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) National Congress (*Muktamar*), incumbent General Chairmen of the PBNU—from Gus Dur and KH Hasyim Muzadi to KH Said Aqil Siradj—have consistently been re-elected for a second consecutive term.
Gus Dur was even elected three times; furthermore, KH Idham Kholid—the PBNU General Chairman prior to the Gus Dur era—served multiple terms spanning 28 years, from 1956 to 1984.
Gus Yahya appears to be an “exception”; it seems unlikely he will be re-elected as PBNU General Chairman for a second term at the 35th NU Congress, scheduled for August 27–31, 2026, at the Tambak Beras Islamic Boarding School in Jombang, East Java.
The reason lies in the nature of his election at the 34th NU Congress in Lampung in 2021—five years ago—which differed significantly from the processes that brought his three aforementioned predecessors to power.
Gus Yahya’s election was driven largely by “political operations” linked to the power dynamics surrounding then-President Jokowi—a foundation that proved quite fragile. This contrasts sharply with the paths taken by Gus Dur, KH Hasyim Muzadi, and KH Said Aqil Siradj, whose elections were the result of “build-up” processes rooted in the cultural consolidation characteristic of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) circles.
This is why, from the perspective of political observer Fahri Ali, the PBNU under Gus Yahya’s leadership has served to reinforce the “regime of power” rather than acting as a hub for civil society movements—a heavy price for NU to pay as a *jam’iyah* (organization) and an Islamic mass organization. Gus Dur was elected General Chairman of PBNU three times; while this was partly due to his “blue-blooded” lineage—as the direct grandson of the organization’s founder—it was equally driven by his sophistication and skill in navigating complex tactical political alliances during the era of the New Order regime’s singular, militaristic hegemony.
Subsequently, KH Hasyim Muzadi and KH Said Aqil Siradj were each elected General Chairman of PBNU twice. The difference lay in their paths: KH Hasyim Muzadi’s election was driven by his organizational consolidation and maturity, whereas KH Said Aqil Siradj’s election relied more on the scholarly expertise required for PBNU leadership during his era.
While describing their elections in such terms is admittedly oversimplified, the key point is that none of the three were chosen through “political operations” based on power dynamics, allowing them greater independence in leading PBNU.
All three cultivated strong connections within the PWNU (provincial) and PCNU (branch) ecosystems, making re-election easier; their relationships were mutually reinforcing rather than based on an authoritarian “big boss” dynamic.
This stands in stark contrast to the election of Gus Yahya at the 34th Muktamar (Congress) in Lampung in 2021, where his selection was heavily tied to the instruments of power wielded by the Jokowi regime at the time.
Consequently, when the political “pendulum” swung from Jokowi to Prabowo—bringing a shift in political interests—the forces that had previously coalesced around Gus Yahya’s political alliances fractured.
The influence of his younger brother, Gus Yaqut—who had been deliberately appointed Minister of Religious Affairs by Jokowi—and the backing of figures like Gus Ipul, Nusron Wahid, and Khofifah Indar Parawangsa within Gus Yahya’s faction, were no longer present.
Gus Yahya has lost many of the factors that enabled his election as PBNU General Chairman at the 34th Muktamar in Lampung five years ago. On the other hand, Gus Yahya’s “inner circle” consists largely of academics and social media activists—individuals lacking political negotiation experience and skills, relying instead on sophisticated social media narratives to bolster their standing.
This context explains why it will be difficult for Gus Yahya to secure a second term at the upcoming 35th NU Congress in Jombang—or to follow in the footsteps of his three immediate predecessors, all of whom were elected to at least two consecutive terms.
In other words, the 35th NU Congress could potentially break the historical tradition wherein the incumbent PBNU Chairman is consistently re-elected—a pattern seen with leaders ranging from KH Idham Kholid, Gus Dur, and KH Hasyim Muzadi to KH Said Aqil Siradj.
Above all, whoever emerges victorious at the 35th NU Congress in Tambak Beras, Jombang, the cost would be far too high for NU—with its tens of millions of followers—if the organization were merely to serve as a “support system” for the ruling political regime, devoid of meaningful, critical, and constructive participation.
Let us await the unfolding dynamics leading up to the climax of the 35th NU Congress in late August 2026, along with all the attendant probabilities and potential surprises.
Regards.
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