PKB INDRAMAYU AND REFLECTIONS ON PKB’S 28TH ANNIVERSARY IN 2026, GROUNDING SERVICE RAISING HIMMAH


*PKB INDRAMAYU AND REFLECTIONS ON PKB’S 28TH ANNIVERSARY IN 2026, GROUNDING SERVICE RAISING HIMMAH*

By: Adlan Daie
Political analyst, Secretary General of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of Indramayu Regency.

Indramayu, July 19, 2026

The Indramayu National Awakening Party (PKB) under the leadership of H. Amroni, S.Ip, in the 2024 elections must be recognized as having achieved a historic “exponential” electoral success, as seen from electoral data since PKB became a participant in the 1999 elections.

This is called exponential because PKB Indramayu’s vote share in the 2024 elections was the highest compared to previous elections, achieving 179,566 votes, equivalent to 18.17%, exceeding the West Java provincial average (11.16%) and the national average (10.02%), with a total of 10 seats in the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD).

PKB is certainly more than just an electoral contest. It was not born out of an agreement of “pragmatic interests.” It emerged from what Gus Dur called the “subculture” of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), based on the value system and ideals championed by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) “jam’iyah.” That is the “exception” of the National Awakening Party (PKB) as a political party.

Therefore, the momentum of commemorating PKB’s 28th anniversary on July 23, 2026, is crucial for PKB, including PKB Indramayu, to strike a balance between “reflecting” on its 28-year political journey, between efforts to ground “khidmah” (religious service) and elevating “himmah” (intelligible character).

Establishing “khidmah” is an effort by PKB to reconstruct its “khidmah,” or political devotion, in a proportional balance with efforts to elevate “himmah,” a planned ambition for projected electoral gains in the 2029 elections.

In the context of this “khidmah,” the legislative, budgetary, and oversight powers held by PKB in the legislative body are not merely understood as administrative tools, but as instruments for determining whether the state is working for the people or merely serving itself.

All three (legislation, budget, checks and balances) are tools to ensure justice remains alive and prosperity is not monopolized. Even within the context of the struggle, which represents the strengthening of NU’s value system, it is not projected solely as an electoral “trade-off.”

For example, the PKB’s success in championing the establishment of National Santri Day (HSN) every October 22nd in the state gazette and Law No. 18 of 2019 concerning Islamic Boarding Schools (Pesantren) cannot be interpreted solely as a matter of political pragmatism.

The two cultural identities of NU mentioned above, namely santri and pesantren, successfully championed by PKB, marked the political victory of “Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah” (Aswaja), a NU religious doctrine that had been marginalized by mainstream state policies.

That is NU’s cultural identity, a “specialness” and “specialness” of PKB as a political party born from the value system and ideals championed by NU—unlike most political parties in Indonesia. Here, in the context of PKB Indramayu, it is crucial to champion the “derivatives” of its facilitation at the regional level.

In an effort to elevate the “himmah” (the national assembly), the PKB’s optimistic ambition of 15 seats in the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) by 2029, as stated by H. Amroni, S. Ip, Chairman of the PKB Branch Executive Board (DPC PKB) at the opening of the PKB Regional Conference (April 18, 2026), is neither simple nor impossible.

This is because the current electoral political regime tends to be increasingly “floating,” with votes floating, where the possibility of a party’s electoral “incentive” or “deficit” depends on internal solidarity, accurate issue branding, and the distribution of party and candidate roles.

Equilibrium within electoral districts is crucial for early detection to prevent a repeat of the 2024 election, when PKB outvoted 11,000 votes, but secured two seats less. This requires electoral district-based survey research, not speculation and the romanticization of previous elections.

In general, the updated survey data from the “Political Indicators” (2025 edition) on the voting behavior of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) members in the 2024 election, as a significant voter base, can be adapted into the PKB’s political strategy, although it will not be electorally monolithic for PKB.

However, the NU social base, as found in the survey above, is more easily “conquered” by PKB electorally if intensive involvement in PKB political organizing is achieved compared to cultivating the “party ID” of other parties, which, in addition to the high cost, will result in insignificant results.

(For more information, please read the author’s article on the variables and social networks of NU members as the PKB voter base in Indramayu in “Jayanews,” April 26, 2026.)

Within this balance, the 28th anniversary of the PKB in 2026 is positioned as a reflection for the Indramayu PKB to ground “khidmah” and elevate “himmah” in its political endeavors. Congratulations! **

Wassalam
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