*THREE CRUCIAL SHIFTS IN THE PBNU AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE 35TH NU CONGRESS IN AUGUST 2026*
By: H. Adlan Daie
Political analyst, General Secretary of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) for Indramayu Regency
According to Fahri Ali, a senior socio-political observer, there have been three crucial shifts accompanying the PBNU leadership succession following the 34th NU Congress in Lampung in 2021—five years ago.
Not only has the PBNU leadership changed from KH. Said Aqil Siradj to Gus Yahya, but the PBNU, as the highest leadership of the NU organization, has experienced a process of degradation as a hub of civil society power in the past five years.
First, the most crucial shift is the PBNU’s position in the relationship between the state and society. The PBNU’s position, seen by the public, and even Nahdliyyin (NU members), has in the past five years favored strengthening the state’s position rather than acting as a civil society force to protect the community.
Second, the PBNU (National Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board) has stalled, failing to intellectually generate radical ideas within the national spectrum amidst social disruption. The PBNU is trapped in a “floating” state, drifting without strong ideological roots, preoccupied with adjusting to power plays, and not guiding the direction of civilization within the structures beneath it.
Third, the PBNU has not exponentially transformed NU into a major force in civil society, stalling halfway—a “halfway struggle.” Instead of becoming a strategic social force, the PBNU has chosen a “pleasure zone,” positioning itself as a substitute for the power structure with all its various political concessions.
These are three important variations of the shift in NU subcultural power within the PBNU’s organic representation over the past five years, from Fahri Ali’s perspective. He then concludes this:
“Without continued intellectualization that extends from its pesantren roots to the global stage, NU’s future bargaining position is threatened with becoming merely a follower of the interests of those in power rather than a determinant of the nation’s direction,” wrote Fahri Ali.
Unfortunately, Fahri Ali doesn’t examine the “cause” or “illat” (in Islamic boarding school jargon) for the reasons behind this shift in degradation over the past five years, and whether the 35th NU Congress, projected to be held in August 2026, could lead to a “rebound” and allow NU to rediscover its “DNA.”
In the author’s opinion, the election of Gus Yahya as Chairman of the PBNU, and even the election of KH Miftahul Akhyar as Rois Am of the PBNU at the 34th NU Congress in Lampung in 2021, cannot be separated from the political orchestration of the political power relations (Jokowi) at that time.
This means that, in terms of political gestures, the election of Gus Yahya as Chairman of the PBNU is relatively different from the elections of Gus Dur, KH Hasyim Muzadi, and KH Said Aqil Siradj as Chairman of the PBNU—his predecessors. Therefore, Gus Yahya’s leadership in the PBNU has implications for the crucial shifts Fahri Ali mentioned above.
Gus Dur’s election as chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU), particularly at two crucial NU congresses (in Situbondo in 1984 and in Cipasung in Tasikmalaya in 1994), demonstrated NU’s strong resilience and tactical prowess, preventing intervention by “external” parties who were desperate to dictate the outcome of the congresses.
Gus Dur’s election was supported by a combination of NU’s lineage, as the direct grandson of the NU founder and an NU intellectual icon par excellence. He possessed sophisticated skills, expertise, and the ability to navigate complex tactical political alliances during the era of the single hegemony of the New Order regime.
Subsequently, KH. Hasyim Muzadi and KH. Said Aqil Siradj were elected as chairman of the PBNU during the Reform Order era. The difference is that KH Hasyim Muzadi was elected due to his consolidated strength and organizational maturity, while KH Said Aqil Sirodj was more supported by his mastery of the knowledge needed for PBNU leadership during his era.
In Gus Yahya’s election, the most determining factor was the palace’s (Jokowi’s) political operations for the 2024 presidential election. Therefore, it’s no surprise that under Gus Yahya’s leadership, NU has become “fully political,” more than any political party in orchestrating NU in the public sphere to adapt to the political interests of those in power.
The point is, as long as the 35th NU Congress in August 2026 remains subject to the interests of political power, whoever is elected as the Rois Am and the general chairman of PBNU will lack the “energy” to rebound and rediscover the three variables of NU’s fading “DNA” as outlined by Fahri Ali above.
Of course, we cannot prevent the will of “external” political powers from influencing the 35th NU Congress and interfering “backstage” in deciding who the desired general chairman, or even the desired Rois Am of the PBNU, will be. After all, NU, with its tens of millions of followers, is politically “sexy,” especially in the era of an electoral political regime.
Now it’s up to the PWNU and PCNU, as the ones holding the voting mandate at the Congress, to determine whether they possess the right mentality is the resilience demonstrated during the NU Congress in Cipasung in 1994, or is the NU Congress in 2026 merely a new variation in the rhythm of adapting to the whims of political power relations?
Let’s wait—not hoping for NU to become a political “opposition,” because NU’s “Maqom” is not at the level of practical politics, but rather politics within the spectrum of the community, nation, and state. This is about restoring NU’s “DNA” after the 35th Congress as a powerful hub of civil society.
NU will once again “tawashut,” standing at the middle ground between the interests of the state and the interests of the people, a balance for the benefit of the public and the state. History will record this.
Indramayu, April 15, 2026
Wassalam
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