THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PKB AND NU FROM FAHRI ALI’S PERSPECTIVE, REFLECTION ON PKB’S 28TH ANNIVERSARY
By: Adlan Daie
Political analyst, General Secretary of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of Indramayu Regency
Indramayu, July 25, 2026
Reflecting on PKB’s 28th anniversary in 2026 is important not only for PKB to conduct historical self-reflection on its political journey, but also for NU, the Islamic organization that gave birth to PKB, to strengthen the reciprocal relationship between the two.
From the perspective of Fahri Ali, a senior socio-political observer, in his article in the daily Kompas (February 14, 2022) entitled “The History of Nahdliyyin,” PKB is cited as one of three variables that impact and influence NU’s progress.
Fahri Ali mentioned three factors: Gus Dur, an iconic NU figure with a broad spectrum of thought that influenced NU; the growth of NU intellectuals within the national intellectual landscape; and the National Awakening Party (PKB), a party born from NU’s womb during the Reformation era.
This means that the relationship between PKB and NU, from Fahri Ali’s perspective, is more than just a historical, ideological, and aspirational one, as outlined in the “mabda’ syasyi” (the foundational principles of PKB’s political struggle, born from NU’s womb).
Moreover, once again, from Fahri Ali’s perspective, the relationship between NU and PKB is one in which PKB impacts and influences NU’s progress. This is what is meant by the “new” relationship between NU and PKB in this article.
It is quite simple to explain Fahri Ali’s statement about the impact and influence of PKB’s presence on NU’s progress within the power relations of state policy.
First, the National Awakening Party (PKB), under the leadership of Gus Muhaimin, successfully championed the establishment of National Santri Day (HSN) every October 22nd in the state gazette—Presidential Decree No. 22 of 2015.
Second, PKB successfully pushed for Law No. 18 of 2019 concerning the NU “subculture” of Islamic boarding schools to mark NU’s affirmative transformation within the spectrum of state political policy, or the “nation state.”
The two “original” cultural identities of NU—santri and pesantren—which had been marginalized for decades from the mainstream of the state, only able to proclaim that NU had a significant stake in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia—were successfully penetrated by PKB within the power relations of state political policy.
This is the impact of PKB’s presence on NU’s progress, NU’s practical political instrument. Not only is it impossible to separate the historical relationship between the two, but it is also impossible to negate PKB’s contribution to NU’s progress from Fahri Ali’s perspective.
Furthermore, from Fahri Ali’s perspective, the presence of the National Awakening Party (PKB) in the state’s political “superstructure” has opened up the structure of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) articulation within “public history,” a social transformation that has had a sociological impact on NU’s progress in various state policies.
This means that, while previously, in Clifford Geetzt’s political anthropology theory, santri were merely a “rural traditionalist” social group, now the political presence of the PKB provides a gateway for santri to enter the elite social structure within state policy relations that were previously dominated only by the “abangan priyayi.”
In this context, Gus Muhaimin’s involvement in the 35th NU Congress, for example, cannot be interpreted simply as “meddling” to maintain PKB’s electoral base within the social base of NU voters.
This is because, according to several survey findings, the “party identity” or political choice of NU members is “built-in” to PKB, and it is difficult to thwart, even by structural NU figures.
(The variables influencing NU members’ political choices, according to survey data, will be discussed in the next series of articles.)
This involvement is more of a “historical mandate” and PKB’s historical responsibility to NU, which gave birth to it. It is PKB’s effort to maintain the relevance of NU’s strategic role for the future of Indonesia, which has an absolute Muslim majority of “Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah.”
Therefore, NU should reciprocally affirm and exert effort toward strengthening PKB’s electoral position, at least without disrupting PKB’s political ecosystem in its efforts to increase its electoral trend within the top three in the 2029 election.
The stronger PKB is electorally, the stronger its influence in influencing state policy to construct solutions to the grassroots social problems faced by NU members.
It was at this point that the new impact of the relationship between NU and PKB began to be felt, its benefits and advantages in the public sphere of the Indonesian people and nation.**
Wassalam.
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