*PRESIDENTIAL REGULATION NO. 151 OF 2014 CONCERNING FUNDING ASSISTANCE FOR MUI ACTIVITIES, A PERSPECTIVE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A PANCASILA-BASED STATE*
By: H. Adlan Daie
Political analyst, Secretary General of the MUI, Indramayu Regency.
Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 151 of 2014 concerning “Funding Assistance for the Activities of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI)” still exists as a form of “Mandatory Spending,” a form of state expenditure legitimacy guaranteed by state regulations.
This Perpres is not a ministerial-level technical directive but rather an affirmative state recognition of the MUI’s existence as a religious authority within the construction of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on the nation’s ideology, Pancasila.
Pancasila is the final ideology of the Indonesian nation. In Prof. Nurcholish Madjid’s construction, it is called the “kalimatun sawa’,” the meeting point of Islam and Indonesian-ness in the reality of Indonesia’s absolute Muslim majority.
Within this construction, it is crucial to actualize the formulation of follow-up implementation of the Presidential Decree. In this context, both the state (government) and the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) must build a partnership commitment down to the regional government level, as mandated by the Presidential Decree, particularly Article 4, paragraph 2.
Here, the meeting point of the partnership between the MUI and the state (government), citing Gus Dur’s construction, is a “complementary” relationship, complementing each other. The state revitalizes the MUI’s role in strengthening the ecosystem of social ethics in the public sphere, and the MUI injects religious moral values to maintain the state’s political authority.
That is why the Presidential Decree is not merely a “passive grant” from the state, but rather a constitutional obligation for the state to revitalize the MUI’s role within the framework of strengthening the integration of Islam and nationalism within the collective “spiritual atmosphere” of the Indonesian nation.
During the New Order era, although the MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council) was established in 1975 at the initiative of the government, and was even once called a “state-owned” organization, the two did not always align. Instead, they experienced a volatile relationship on several issues and were critical of several government policies. They were distinct entities and social institutions.
The government did not need to overly “dictate” the MUI’s political orientation, and the MUI did not force itself to become a “floating” institution, adrift without strong roots in Islamic doctrine. It was not preoccupied with adjusting to the whims of political power, but rather strengthened its complementary partnership.
The MUI’s duties and responsibilities, as a religious institution within the Pancasila state, are “Himayatul Ummah,” protecting the community from unhealthy social environments and non-halal consumption, and “Khadimul Ummah,” providing easy access for the community to carry out their religious obligations.
This implementation is embedded in the “Shodiqul Hukumah” relationship, a partnership with the government to maintain social order and constructive and productive political stability in the life of the nation and state, where the absolute majority of Indonesians are Muslim.
The above perspective explains that the “MUI Activity Funding Assistance” mandated in the Presidential Decree is directed, among other things, towards:
First, routinely reviewing MUI fatwas, whether requested or not, within the framework of providing guidance for the social life of the community based on the principles of “religious law” within the spectrum of Pancasila values, strengthening national integration and Indonesian-ness within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).
Second, educating “ulama cadres” (muballig) with a national perspective based on the “mushalla” (musholla) and “majelis taklim” (Islamic study groups) community to protect the community from elements of “radicalism” at the grassroots level that could potentially damage the national spectrum while also strengthening the principles of “Islam wasathiyah” (moderate Islam).
Therefore, the spirit of the Presidential Regulation above is not to politically control the MUI by political powers. The MUI’s position is not a practical political “opposition.” Rather, the MUI is political within the spectrum of the community, nation, and state, in a balance of “enjoining good and forbidding evil” over the guiding values of Pancasila.
This means that the Presidential Regulation is a state initiative to revitalize the MUI’s role in providing a supportive system for state policies for the public good, while also providing a moral and ethical balance to prevent the destruction of state policies.
It would certainly be a shame if the Presidential Regulation above, born from the commitment of the nation’s top leadership as an effort to “instill” the values of Pancasila, were not implemented proportionally in budgetary policies at all levels of government.**
Indramayu, April 25, 2026
Wassalam.
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