THE NU PBLIC CONFLICT AND NU’S EXCEPTIONALITY: WHICH SIDE WILL THE GOVERNMENT TAKE?
By: H. Adlan Daie
Political and socio-religious analyst
Prof. Burhanudin Muhtadi, Professor of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at UIN Jakarta, in his article in Tempo magazine titled “NU’s Exceptionalism” (August 15, 2015), attributes NU’s “exceptionalism” to its difficult-to-concise gestures, always presenting an “element of surprise,” unexpected surprises.
The author defines NU’s “exceptionality” or “uniqueness” as a “Jam’iyah” (mass organization) precisely because NU is indeed “more than just” an Islamic organization. NU differs from most Islamic organizations in Indonesia genealogically, especially with political parties as the “suprastructure” of state politics.
In the context of NU’s “exceptionality,” the author believes, the government will not side with any faction in the current PBNU elite conflict. NU is too complex to be reduced to a debate about the interpretation of its articles of association (AD/ART) with their respective claims of truth. NU is too simplistic if it is narrowed down to just the affairs of the PBNU.
Too “kemajon,” in the Javanese political terminology of sociologist Prof. Umar Kayam, means being too “confident” when a conflicting party within the PBNU appears to have received the government’s “blessing,” simply by looking at indicative variables such as the presence of a “bureaucratic figure” at an event belonging to one of the conflicting factions within the PBNU.
President Prabowo, since his active military career, has interacted extensively with Islamic boarding school (pesantren) kiai (religious leaders) and understands that pesantren are a supporting subculture for NU. Therefore, the voice of pesantren, especially those that form the NU’s primary cultural base, will be a crucial factor in his policy decisions regarding the PBNU conflict.
NU, as a “Jam’iyyah,” is clearly distinct from political parties, and even genealogically, from “modernist” Islamic organizations. They are generally formed first structurally with the formulation of a vision and mission, then develop their service by expanding their structural wings to the regions.
NU is the opposite. NU was founded and established by kiai (Islamic scholars) who did not follow the theory of “global modernism” mentioned above. NU’s social ecosystem was established first through the network of religious cultural traditions of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), then structured into a formal organizational structure due to legal and administrative interests in relations with other institutions.
In other words, NU’s cultural strength preceded its structural strength. Therefore, winning the “conflict” within the PBNU (National Board of Nahdlatul Ulama) is more complex. It cannot simply be a matter of securing a decree for formal structural legality but also of gaining recognition for the cultural morality of Islamic boarding schools, an inseparable variable of NU.
That is NU’s “exceptionalism,” founded as a meeting point for the “signs of heaven” and the responsibility of the “caliphate” of the kiai on earth. NU’s growth, existence, and growth are not “nurtured” by the state, but rather subsidized by the spiritual energy of hundreds of millions of its followers—certainly without rejecting a strategic and tactical partnership with the government.
In this context, the statement by Gus Salam, the caretaker of the Denanyar Islamic boarding school in Jombang, East Java, who reminded the PBNU elite not to involve the government or for the government to interfere in the internal conflict within the PBNU elite, is relevant. As quoted by the media outlet “RMOL.ID” on December 11, 2025, Gus Salam urged the government not to interfere in the PBNU conflict and reminded them that the legitimacy of the NU leadership does not come from the government, namely the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, but rather from the recognition of Islamic boarding school ulama (Islamic boarding school scholars).
For Gus Salam, “Although Jam’iyyah NU is bound by the Law on Mass Organizations (Ormas), the legal status of NU’s establishment was established before the formation of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia,” Gus Salam stated in the media outlet “RMOL.”
This means, “The primary recognition of the PBNU leadership is the recognition of Islamic boarding school ulama (Islamic boarding school scholars) represented by NU structures at the regional, branch, and sub-branch levels,” Gus Salam further explained.
Therefore, the only way to end the conflict is an Extraordinary Congress (MLB), agreed upon as soon as possible. Any action outside the MLB forum has the potential to cause even greater turbulence within the PBNU.
This is the highest deliberative forum for NU organizations. It is constitutional, according to the provisions of the Articles of Association (AD/ART), and a dignified way to return NU to its “owners,” the participants of the Congress throughout Indonesia, the social representation of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren).
Within this framework, the author once again believes the government will not side with any faction within the PBNU. The government fully understands that NU is more than just a legally structured mass organization, but also a social ecosystem of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), which will serve as a benchmark for the government.
At the most, encourage a joint agreement to expedite the MLB, involving prominent Islamic boarding school figures to prevent the PBNU from becoming a prolonged “spectacle” for conflict, and to re-establish itself as a “guide” for exemplary morality for the community.**
Indonesia, December 16, 2025
Wassalam
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